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‘ THE WORLD OF MADE 
IS NOT THE WORLD OF BORN’: 
America and the Edge of the Continent
I gazing at the boundaries of granite and spray, the established
sea-marks, felt behind me
Mountain and plain, the immense breadth of the continent, before
me the mass and doubled stretch of water.
Robinson Jeffers, ‘Continent’s End’
At the beginning of his great 1927 poem Women at Point 
Sur, Robinson Jeffers offers a harsh judgment of the American 
mind as a producer of a culture of avoidance or evasion. In Jef-
fers’ words, ‘You chose to ignore consciousness, incredible how 
quickly / The American mind short-circuits by ignoring its object. 
/ Something in the gelded air of the country’ (Jeffers, 1927: 26). 
It is a commentary on the conversation that Reverend Barclay 
has just had with a boy working at a hotel, and whose opinion 
as to a possible existence of God he is asking. Since there comes 
no answer to the interrogation, ‘Do you think there’s a God?’, 
and the young man does not seem to have an opinion at all, 
these circumstances occasion Reverend Barclay’s angry dismissal 
of America not as incidentally empty of interest in the transcen-
dental but as purposefully choosing such ignorance. America 
bespeaks double ignorance: 1) it ignores consciousness (which, 
for Jeffers, stands for the ability to live and investigate life 
in a most serious manner), and 2) this ignorance leads to the sec-
ond type of evasion—America, in avoiding all the seriousness of life 
and developing new strategies of disarming life’s seriousness, 




























in life, what makes life serious, why life IS serious, has been 
eliminated from the American life, which therefore presents itself 
as ‘gelded’, i.e., deprived of what is essential for life to happen.
Life in what Jeffers refers to as ‘America’ develops in the aura 
of a certain vital lack that makes this life almost a parody 
of existence. Life conceived under the auspices of ‘something 
gelded’ is monstrous or phantasmatic, and this spectrality can 
be documented upon the level of the self (‘consciousness’), 
the state (‘America’), and God. Each of these phantasms turns 
its own existence into a peculiar kind of imprisonment in which 
what Jeffers repeatedly names ‘inexhaustible life, incomparable 
power, inhuman knowledge’ changes into no more than a ‘blind 
adventure’ (Jeffers, 1927: 90, 21). In consequence, the solidity 
of the structure called ‘America’, its  ‘wall-ed’ streets, and man-
sions that advertise the present and future prosperity are now 
revealed to be constructions of spectral urbanity and phan-
tomatic architecture. As Reverend Barclay contends, ‘Sticks 
plastered, cloth, books, what they call a home; / Framed to wall 
out the wild face of eternity’ (Jeffers, 1927: 23). Jeffers avows 
then that ‘America’ is a project, the heart of which was the ambi-
tion to conquer wilderness (hence the mythology of the frontier 
and pioneer). The project backfired, or short-circuited, because, 
while successfully eliminating the natural wild, it has forsaken 
the existential wild, which must always be kept and preserved 
as a condition of existence. ‘America’ grows as the Enlighten-
ment project of the civilizing illumination which compromises 
itself by ‘enlightening’ the world to such a degree that it has 
neglected the necessary ‘dark’ mysteriousness that is neces-
sary for life to flourish. 
America, then, would answer all the conditions which Jan 
Patočka sets for the politics of the inexorable ‘rule of the day’ 
which runs the world more and more profoundly into war. Thus, 
life has become ‘exhausted’, power has devolved to become 
a mere game of comparison and formulating competitive promises, 
and knowledge has been reduced to the domain of human-all-
too-human. Thus, to redeem ‘America’ one ought to undertake 
a threefold mission of 1) thinking and living life as ‘inexhaustible’, 






















of another organization of social life not outside but within 
the very social texture (politics which would demonstrate 
some ‘outside’, some ‘sense as an outside that is opened right 
in the middle of the world, right in the middle of us and between 
us as our common sharing out’ [Nancy, 2010: 18]), and 3) work-
ing upon epistemologies that would reconnect the human with 
the non-human. Right in the middle of the countercultural turmoil 
of 1967, Norman O. Brown professed in his Harvard lecture such 
a vision of the redeemed America: ‘My utopia is / an environment 
that works so well / that we can run wild in it / anarchy in an 
environment that works’ (Brown, 2008: 207). The environment 
in question is a well-organized network of ‘all public utilities’ which 
are fundamental factors in bringing about what Brown calls ‘uni-
fication’, a new type of community, a new type of a social body, 
‘love’s body’, which empowers individuals rather than the abstract 
system. This ‘unification’ is an ethical-technological-aesthetic 
project, a work of such teachers in utopian engineering as John 
Cage and Buckminster Fuller, of which modern or postmodern 
‘globalization’ seems to be an unwieldy caricature.
To undertake this mission of recasting being, acting, and know-
ing, one has to remain firmly within the world without, at the same 
time, unreservedly endorsing its rules and constitutions. Such 
a position makes affirmation of being possible through the prac-
tice of the Nietzschean Ja-sagen, which, however, has nothing 
to do with plain general commensurability and acceptance 
of the state of things. In his 1940 collection Fifty Poems, e. e. 
cummings, having determined a synonimity between knowl-
edge and appropriation (‘all knowing’s having and have is (you 
guess) / perhaps the very unkindest way to kill’), puts forward 
the following claim: ‘so we’ll/ not have (but i imagine that yes 
is / the only living thing) and we’ll make yes’ (cummings, 1991: 
528). The affirmation in question is a particular way of making 
the world that is not reduced to fabricating things and goods 
and which is closer somehow to un-making of them. ‘yes’ (a 
small letter is necessary) is a true making, not mere fabricating 
or manufacturing. The un-making that we are talking about 
is far from being a destruction or sheer dismantling. We could 





















our perception of what is, thus destabilizing the object and blur-
ring its identity. Second, it breaks a strong connection that has 
always existed between knowing and having; knowledge, as it 
developed in the Western episteme, has always imposed a net-
work of proprietary relationships upon reality. If knowledge was 
the royal way of knowing, then very quickly it energized the com-
plicated and dynamic structure of power and appropriation, which 
needed sciences to determine possessions, locations, territories, 
and zones of influence. ‘yes’, as it perforates this texture, as it 
turns objects into fuzzy appearances, as it undermines having 
as a criminal gesture (‘the unkindest way to kill’), demonstrates 
things in their very existential matter not as instrumentally useful 
objects but as the very manifestation of being (‘is the only living 
thing’). This is a move away from the ‘government of men’ towards 
the ‘government of things’; we shall soon return to this phrase 
of Georges Bataille. Or, in cummings’s words, it is a recognition 
that ‘a world of born is not a world of made’. What lives is a ‘yes’ 
that breaks and opens up  an object, affirms it without accepting 
it, as it is, with a premonition of some ‘elsewhere’ that a given 
object makes visible but that also undoes the object. We are 
very close to what Giorgio Agamben describes as a ‘truly singular’ 
fact about human existence, which ‘is the silent and impervi-
ous intertwining of the two works, the extremely close and yet 
disjointed proceedings of the prophetic word and the creative 
word, of the power of the angel (with which we never cease 
producing and looking ahead) and the power of the prophet 
(that just as tirelessly retrieves, undoes, and arrests the prog-
ress of creation and in this way completes and redeems it)’ 
(Agamben, 2011: 49). cummings’s recognition that ‘progress 
is a comfortable disease’ seems to endorse this diagnosis, which 
combines the inevitability of making with the equally exigent 
force of undoing (cummings, 1991: 554).
In the poem that is a coda to the 50 Poems volume, the ‘yes’ 
(let us never forget—‘the only living thing’) is quite literally 
a synonym of living and, at the same time, a basis for a certain 
new politics of freedom. Liberation is portrayed not in terms 
of a specific class structure or political struggle, but the way 






















refers to as ‘our pure living’) of every human individual. Here 
is e. e. cummings: ‘what freedom’s not some under’s mere 
above / but breathing yes which fear will never no?’ (cummings, 
1991: 538). The task of reinventing politics hinges upon the car-
nalization of freedom; the politics of un-making depends upon 
freedom which, independent of the law, is first of all guaranteed 
by the lived experience of the body. Freedom is embodied, oth-
erwise it is a mere token in the political game; it is, as cummings 
puts it in a later poem, ‘freedom: what makes a slave’ (cummings, 
1991: 834). Thus, freedom cannot be enforced but has to be lived 
in a fully and literally biological way; it belongs to the protocol 
of such final bodily functions as breathing. What is more, this 
kind of freedom, the embodied freedom of ‘yes’, is not vulner-
able to the actions of the apparatus of power, as it lies outside 
the realm of force and enforcement. It is, as cummings empha-
sizes, freedom that ‘fear will never no’. The phonetic ambiguity 
is priceless: embodied freedom, the bio-freedom, is beyond 
the reach of the mental modalities of knowledge (‘know’) 
as a means of enforcing a certain (to use Immanuel Wallerstein’s 
concept) ‘system world’, neither can it be negated (‘no’) by fear 
which, as we learn from further lines in the same poem, leaves 
us within a set of substitutions: ‘hate’ supersedes ‘wisdom’, 
‘doubt blind the brave’, ‘mask’ stands in for ‘face’.
To use a category worked out by Jean-Luc Nancy, we could 
describe such affirmatively un-making ‘yes’ as ‘adoration’. Adora-
tion is an expression of reverence and veneration for the object 
that functions in the structure of our aims and needs, but this 
kind of respect owes its unique status and power to the fact 
that it is, at the same time, a prayerful meditation on what 
takes this object away from these aims and needs defined by our 
organization of life. The very process of ‘un-making’ suggests 
that the object is never complete and finished, never filled sol-
idly and uninterruptedly with matter, but there open in it some 
mysterious holes and ruptures which, potentially at least, remove 
the thing from the realm of human manufacturing. The human 
is punctured by the non-human; the making of the thing always 
inherently has within it the power of un-making; thus the thing 





















The particle ‘un-’ marks the appearance of a certain ‘nothing’ from 
which the thing is being constantly created anew. Hence, Nancy 
is well justified in his claim that ‘adoration is addressed to this 
opening. Adoration consists in holding onto the nothing—without 
reason or origin—of the opening. It is the very fact of this hold-
ing on’ (Nancy, 2013:15). e. e. cummings turns out to be a great 
American practitioner of a ‘yes’ that is the adoration of what 
makes the human world but refuses to be contained in it and by it. 
To know what is ‘the only living thing’, to practice the (un-)making 
power of ‘yes’ that is a form of adoration, we have to emanci-
pate ourselves from the modalities of the human, as cummings 
would put it, from knowing and having. Only then will we able 
to contend that ‘yes is a pleasant country’ (cummings, 1991: 578).
This is a perspective assumed by the poet in the poem 
we have been reading. Its first line announces, in the critical 
turn, the whole project of emancipation: human existence 
(‘who we are’) and actions (‘why we dream’, ‘how we drink crawl 
eat walk die fly do’) cannot be meaningfully envisioned within 
the framework of the aforementioned modalities. As we learn 
from the early section of the poem ‘a peopleshaped toomany-
ness far too’ will never be able to answer the questions that 
have been relegated by these modalities to the domain of banal-
ity or forgetfulness. A ‘peopleshaped toomany-ness’ reveals 
the most essential characteristics of our present situation which, 
for the sake of brevity, can be summarized as a total human-
ization of the world that has acquired the human ‘shape’ even 
in the sphere of natural phenomena. This process has caused 
a dramatic change in the way that man is situated in the whole 
project of creation: loneliness has been replaced by crowdedness, 
the lack and moderation by excess, and too little has become 
‘too many’ which, as its abstract form ‘toomany-ness’ reveals, 
presents itself as an overwhelming scheme that Immanuel 
Wallerstein calls ‘system world’. The ultimate consequence 
of such a situatedness of the human individual is that he/she 
is being translated into a realm that allows for living without 
being anchored in existence, a life that blurs the distinction 
between life and death disfiguring the human connection. 






















What the poet formulates in the rhetoric of excess (‘toomany-
ness’, ‘too-nearishness’) is the world in which everything is ‘far 
too’, i.e., a world subjected to human ambition and desire, a world 
of hasty activism in which un-making has been suppressed 
and misrepresented as a negative and passively destructive 
schemer against the interests of making/fabricating. All these 
insights much later have been taken up  by the philosopher 
claiming that, ‘We are now, admittedly, the masters of the Earth 
and of the world, but our very mastery seems to escape our 
mastery. We have all things in hand, but we do not control 
our powers’ (Serres, 1995: 171).
To save ourselves, to redeem America and Americans, we have 
to overcome the regime of ‘far too’ that eventually leads us, 
as cummings has it, to the point where ‘climbing hope meets 
most despair’ (cummings, 1991: 528). Nancy accentuates that 
adoration, understood as the way of responding to the open-
ings of nothing within the very texture of living, must reduce 
the hubristic ambitions of men: ‘Adoration therefore carries itself 
with a certain humility’. This humility, having nothing to do with 
humiliation, implicates us in the politics of un-making, the model 
of which is to be found in God’s creation of the world ex nihilo, i.e., 
‘of the most humble, of almost nothing, with no regard for what 
is powerful and remarkable’ (Nancy, 2013:15). Such redemptive 
politics, one has to say right at the very beginning, will always 
be in the making, will never be complete and consummated, 
as the force of the particle ‘un-’ is constantly burrowing within 
it. Politics of bio-freedom is politics in the un-making. Norman 
O. Brown makes the link between freedom and unfinishedness 
explicit: ‘Can we liberate instead of repress / Can we find a way 
of being permanently unstable’ (Brown, 2008: 206). A visionary, 
utopian politics happens at the moment when actual dating 
falls into the dateless time of the conditional. As cummings was 
to put it much later, in his last poetic book, ‘at the magical hour / 
when is becomes if’ (cummings, 1991: 802). Mocking the precise 
temporalities of the calendar in the non-time of metamorphosis, 
what takes place at this particular non-time is a critical collapse 
of the rule of the regime of ‘far too’. For cummings, this crisis 





















to the mysteriousness of being alive. This comeback of the enigma 
of living, of living as the enigmatic process, constitutes a deadly 
threat to the world of ‘a peopleshaped toomany-ness’. A clown 
distributing daisies ‘one a winter afternoon’ ‘on eighth street’ 
is what ‘mostpeople fear most: / a mystery(first and last) / 
mostpeople fear most: / a mystery for which i’ve / no word 
except alive /—that is, completely alert / and miraculously whole’ 
(cummings, 1991: 802).
The phrase ‘when is becomes if’ is equivocal: it transfers us 
to some nonthinkable temporality substituting the precision-
ist ‘when’ with most ambiguous ‘if’, but it also problematizes 
the very fundamental verb we use to name our own being. ‘When 
is becomes if’ names also the moment when we tear down 
the illusion of being, when, as e. e. cummings says in another 
poem, we stop taking the mask for the face. But in both cases 
what is essential is breaking through the standard protocols 
of perceiving and knowing the world. What has been solid 
now melts, and the reality usually looking for the expression 
in the indicative mood is being subversively replaced by the con-
ditional (a move to which cummings frequently takes recourse), 
baring the illusory qualities of what we have assumed to be 
the ‘world’. At the same time, it sketches a vision of a world 
which is not but which should be. The ‘if’ mode into which 
e. e. cummings switches his thinking aims at a peculiar kind 
of exodus: its mission is to lead us out of the land in which onto-
logical forgetfulness and misconception concerning being alive 
sanctions the political and social organization. This is the heart 
of cummings’s diagnosis of what Hegel would call ‘the state 
of the world’: under-existence of the human individual is matched 
by the over-existence of the political machinery. The dramati-
cally weakened sense of living, the impairment of what it means 
to live, a certain ontological debilitation—all this is grasped 
in phrases that try to name them as a state of ‘a notalive 
undead’ or ‘unbeingdead isn’t beingalive’ (cummings, 1991: 528, 
803). As cummings phrases it in another poem, this is a situa-
tion where ‘being pay[s] the rent of seem’. America is the place 
of an awkward economy of existence in which to ‘be’ remains 






















to be paid back America has less and less of the authentic life 
and more and more of the simulacrum of life. In another poem, 
cummings turns this life debilitating credit into the very basis 
of the distorted system world: ‘as freedom is a breakfastfood 
/ or truth can live with right and wrong / or molehills are from 
mountain made /—long enough and just so long / will being pay 
the rent of seem’ (cummings, 1991: 511).
In his final collection, cummings coins yet another lapidary 
locution that describes this situation. He speaks about a ‘sub-
human superstate’ (cummings, 1991: 803), and the tension 
between the particles ‘sub-’ and ‘super’ is telling. On the one 
hand, we have everything that is ‘below’, ‘under’ or ‘slightly’ 
(all associated with ‘sub-’); on the other, there are things, attitudes, 
and features that go ‘above’, ‘beyond’ everything that has been 
added to and is supernumerary with regard to what presents 
itself as a standard or means. ‘America’ then is less than human 
and more than human at the same time: less human because 
it effected among its population what Tennyson famously 
called the state of ‘lotus-eaters’, a forgetfulness of being alive, 
and more than human because it replaced the merely human 
with the abstract construction of state violence. It is by far 
unsatisfactory on the level of ‘sense’ and excessive on that 
of economy and political organization. With the economic teach-
ings of John Maynard Keynes in mind, Jean-Luc Nancy helps us 
to understand that ‘subhuman superstate’ refers to unconditional 
preferences for economic thinking in terms of means that have 
shaped Western thinking and society. Thus, he admonishes us 
in the way that cummings would certainly approve: 
[…] we should not start with economy itself or with its regulations, but with 
‘ends’, or rather ‘sense’—let us therefore say simply with metaphysics, or, 
if one prefers, with the terms mysticism or poetics. But whichever name 
one chooses, we must start with the work of thinking through these names, 
the regime of names, the relation to infinite sense. (Nancy, 2013:83)
This is to be read in conjunction with two aspects of the Amer-
ican line of life. First is a constant suspicion that thinking 
or metaphysics is not pertinent for modern democracy, which 





















voiced already by Alexis de Tocqueville and more recently by Stan-
ley Cavell, who combines the question of ‘why America has never 
expressed itself philosophically’ with a difficulty in classifying 
the most important American minds as ‘philosophers’: ‘Why has 
America never expressed itself philosophically? […] the context 
of the question implied that I was taking the question of American 
philosophical expression to be tied up  with the question whether 
Thoreau (and Emerson) are to be recognized as philosophers’ 
(Cavell, 1988: 11). The second line somewhat capitalizes on this 
difficulty of drawing clear boundaries and connects the political 
with the aesthetic. In his revision of modern philosophy, Nor-
man O. Brown sees the chances for ‘unification’ in the degree 
to which the Dionysian principle overcomes the matter-of-factness 
of political reason: ‘Breaking down the boundaries is breaking down 
the reality principle / unification lies beyond the reality-principle 
/ the communion is Dionysian’(Brown, 2008: 206). Having asked 
a question similar to Cavell’s ‘What kind of language might be 
helpful?’, Brown answers: ‘instead of morality, metaphor […] 
the language of healing, or making whole is not psychoanalysis, 
but poetry’ (Brown, 2008: 213).
What is at stake, then, is the way in which we are to confront 
the ‘subhuman superstate’ that is the organization of social 
and political life trying to harness the original chaos and fortuitous-
ness of living, the adventure of being alive, with the preordained 
rules and regulations of the market and political struggle. Political 
life dominating in the present remains in an awkward position 
towards man’s existential challenge. As cummings puts it suc-
cinctly, ‘a politician is an arse upon / which everyone has sat 
except a man’ (cummings, 1991: 550). Attempting to investigate 
reasons for which man has been profoundly betrayed by politics, 
cummings gives us five precise lessons of what is wrong with 
the society of ‘subhuman superstate’. First is a combination 
of what he previously termed as ‘a peopleshaped toomany-ness’ 
and the language that merely reiterates familiar grammatical 
constructions reproducing, in turn, equally familiar structures 
of the world. ‘Toomany-ness’ needs a discourse operating rigor-
ously predictable constructions that guarantee unquestionable 






















and, if need be, quickly brought back to order. A conceivable 
exodus from ‘subhuman superstate’ must imply a discourse 
mixing forms, genders, registers, and which, in the Nietzschean 
mode, cherishes mistake as a figure of truth. The first lesson 
taught by cummings returns us towards the power of the poetic 
and reads, ‘(1) we sans love equals mob / love being youamiare’ 
(cummings, 1991: 803). 
The second lesson transports us to the realm of metaphys-
ics and posits a reshuffling of the order and hierarchy of things 
assumed by the society (‘from second to tenth rate’), which 
alteration brings about a rediscovery of the largely forgotten 
significance of what T.S. Eliot famously rendered as the ‘over-
whelming question’. Here is cummings again: ‘(2) the holy 
miraculous difference between / firstrate & second implies 
nonth / inkable enormousness by con / trast with the tiny 
stumble from second to tenth / rate’ (cummings, 1991: 803). 
What belongs to the rationally organized and enforced order 
of ‘subhuman superstate’ is ‘tiny’ as opposed to the uncon-
cealed mysteriousness of the difference between the created 
(‘firstrate’) and the man-made (‘second’). One has to realize 
that, as cummings maintains in another place, ‘A world of made 
/ is not a world of born’ (cummings, 1991: 554). The difference 
is called ‘holy miraculous’ not because it builds a radical distinc-
tion between the two, but because it tries to find out how 
one always works within the other. As Giorgio Agamben says, 
‘poetry, technology, and art are the inheritors of the angelic work 
of creation. Through the process of secularization of the reli-
gious tradition, however, these disciplines have progressively 
lost all memory of the relationship that has previously linked 
them so intimately to one another’ (Agamben, 2011: 5). What 
e. e. cummings points out is the second directive of our exo-
dus from ‘subhuman superstate’: we will be able to get going 
only if, aware of the difference between ‘firstrate and second’ 
rather than the insignificant distinctions of the hierarchies that 
organize our social and economic policies, we also change our 
epistemologies in such a way that knowing will reclaim the lost 





















Lesson number three retrieves the importance and neces-
sity of the error for being alive, this time transferring it from 
the linguistic to the theological. Lucidity of thinking is prepared 
by the sincerity of transgression: ‘(3) as it was in the begin / ning 
it is now and always will be or / the onehundredpercentoriginal 
sin / cerity equals perspicuity’ (cummings, 1991: 803). This clearly 
dovetails with the postulate to meditate upon the ‘nonthink-
able enormousness’ as the very notion of enormousness (which 
in another text cummings refers to as the ‘immeasurable is’ 
[cummings, 1991: 521]). This lesson expropriates the scientific-
logical approaches that have always been used in the Western 
tradition to characterize thinking. The fourth lesson is that 
of the necessity of independent thinking (‘Only the Game Fish 
Swims Upstream’), while the fifth one resounds the warning 
signal against a spectral life which the ‘subhuman superstate’ 
imposes upon man (‘unbeingdead isn’t beingalive’). Thus further 
directives that need to guide us in our exodus are: retrieving 
a thinking that will problematize the instrumentality of our 
tele-techno-scientific epistemologies and modes of notation 
(cumming’s typography prompts us to believe that ‘nonth-
inkable’ is also non-inkable) and help to identify and exorcize 
the spectral element which not only haunts but plainly takes 
over and dominates our living. The critique of the ‘subhuman 
superstate’ thus entails a necessary foray into the domain 
of what Jacques Derrida called ‘hauntology’.
The conditional introduced by ‘if’ opens a certain non-time, 
or, perhaps, it would be more accurate to say that it introduces 
some kind of future different from what we regularly refer 
to as a future event. That is, the future of the ‘if’ structure 
both promises the continuity and denies the calendar sequence. 
It ‘promises’ by the very fact that it projects some different 
state of things. It separates such state in time from what 
is going on now by moving it to some indescribable moment 
of time; it denies, as facts taking place within ‘if’ are merely 
shadows of real, matter-of-fact occurrences, they exist in such 
a weak mode that they are mere shadows, figments of wild 
imagination or a trick of rationality that has all of a sudden lost 






















to a future understood as what will happen tomorrow, or next year, 
but to some indescribable futurity bereft of standard measures 
of dating. If ‘future’ basically consists in being loyal to the past 
standards of time, ‘futurity’ announces a kind of time liberated 
from such previous loyalties. The ‘if’ construction of the world 
implies, as we have noticed after Agamben, a constant action 
and counteraction of the poetic and the prophetic, of a promise 
and a denial, of ethical brotherhood on the one hand and the lib-
erty and equality manipulatively involved in the political game 
on the other. Of such futurity speaks William Blake in a passage 
from Vala, or the Four Zoas:
Why roll thy clouds in sick’ning mists? I can no longer hide
The dismal vision of mine eyes. O love & life & light!
Prophetic dreads urge me to speak: futurity is before me
Like a dark lamp. Eternal death haunts all my expectation.
Rent from Eternal Brotherhood we die & are no more 
(Blake, 1797: V, 3, 71–76)
For David Herbert Lawrence, America posits precisely the prob-
lem of futurity which, disentangled from the past, is searching 
its forms of materialization. If Europe stands for a ‘future’ under-
stood as a reiteration of the past (of what Lawrence refers to as 
‘tradition’ [Lawrence, 1972: 774]), America faces a ‘futurity’, i.e., 
a future that not only cannot be understood in terms of the past 
(‘it is easy enough to be faithful to a tradition’) but cannot, 
in fact, find a form for itself. Futurity of America, unlike future 
of Europe, is deprived of structures, or at least its structures are 
unknown and unthinkable. Lawrence speaks of ‘an unrevealed 
future’, ‘an unborn future’, ‘as-yet-unknowable American future’—
formulations not so much referring to the uncertain character 
of events to come but, more significantly, accentuating the fact 
that the very criteria and categorizations that normally allow us 
to think up  and of a future lose all their weight. Thus, not only 
do we not know what a future will bring about but – a much 
more dramatic caesura—we have no categories and measures 
that would allow us to invent and draw a map of such a future. 
As Lawrence says, what we call futurity of America is ‘Not 
a mob thing, nor a mass thing, nor a class thing, nor a hundred-





















half-unrealised in individual hearts, and nowhere else’ (Lawrence, 
1972: 775). We should certainly mark the unreadiness of America 
that looms like a vision rather than a fully articulated project. 
America is not ‘a hundred-per-cent thing’, i.e., it cannot be cap-
tivated by itself, functioning for two centuries as a destination 
for generations of migrants, it has to lose itself as a destina-
tion point. People have flocked to America to establish their 
future there, and, paradoxically, to secure this aim America has 
to disestablish, undo its own future, dismantle the solidity of its 
metaphysical foundations and the political, economic and social 
structures erected upon them.
What characterizes the futurity of America is a peculiar situ-
atedness of the human element. The magisterial role of history 
always presenting itself as a collection of lessons helping men 
to think up  their future has been radically reduced: we learn from 
Lawrence’s text that, ‘America will have to find her own way into 
the future, / the old lights won’t show the way’ (Lawrence, 1972: 
775). If history, which allows for the construction of a future, fol-
lows the dictate of the ‘old lights’, America and its futurity clearly 
do not belong to this regime (as e. e. cummings puts it, ‘all his-
tory’s a winter sport or three’ [cummings, 1991: 579]). Robinson 
Jeffers is probably most extreme in voicing his violent abdication 
from human history. Having, in one of his suppressed poems, 
metaphorized humanity as ‘the semi-delirious patient’ who has 
amassed heavy ‘lumber’ of wars, the poet determines the crucial 
question as an investigation concerning how much of this human 
experience will be carried into the future: ‘The question is / How 
much all this amazing lumber the pale convalescent / Stagger-
ing back towards life will be able to carry up  the / steep gorges 
that thrid the cliffs of the future?’ (Jeffers, 1977: 162). The world 
needs futurity rather than a ‘future’, the openness to the non-
human rather than a hopeless confinement to the vicious circle 
of human history in which ‘Roosevelt, Hitler and Guy Fawkes 
/ Hanged above the garden walks, / While the happy children 
cheer, / Without hate, without fear, / And new men plot a new 
war’ (Jeffers, 1977: 156) .
A withdrawal from human history and its basic concepts 






















moves us towards the domain of bios, life which does not rec-
ognize a difference between the individual and the mass. When 
Lawrence repeatedly speaks about the ‘germ of that future 
[which] is inside the American people’, the germ that is ‘little’ 
and ‘struggling’, he seems to make two important gestures 
(Lawrence, 1972: 775). The first allows him to reach out towards 
life that exists in its potential only; life is a germ that gathers 
within it forces ready to start growing but yet dormant. Thus, 
futurity of America belongs to a kind of life that has not begun 
yet; America is a life-to-come, its ‘future’ is precisely a ‘futurity’ 
because we can only know or intuit its potential, never fully 
realized form. The second gesture amplifies this ambiguity 
by pointing out that this life-to-come which is futurity of America 
is a manifestation of the potency for growing and germinating 
and, at the same time, of a most serious threat against itself. 
A germ is the strongest promise of life exuberant and, simul-
taneously, a menacing microorganism, a bacteria, which may 
at any moment disempower and cancel this promise. Futurity 
of America is both an invitation and deterrent, hospitality 
and hostility, futurity of puissance and deadly illness.
The expression ‘life-to-come’ as the rendition of futurity 
of America is equivocal in itself. The secret of futurity of America, 
as Lawrence divulges, consists in reversing the normal sequence 
of events and also in the undoing of the machinery of ‘prog-
ress’ as conceived by the Enlightenment tradition. In the end, 
the future of America, its futurity, is, paradoxically, a denial 
of what is to come. As Lawrence explains, America must free 
itself from its own image as construed by others, by the world 
that ‘calls upon America to act in a certain way’ (Lawrence, 1972: 
775). It must never ‘acquiesce’; Americans are loyal to their futu-
rity which, however, is not ‘to come’, but which has to, reading 
e. e. cummings again, ‘undream a dream’ of America (cummings, 
1991: 556). In a significant passage, D.H. Lawrence juxtaposes 
various nations that have constituted America and the native 
Indian population: ‘Turn the Poles, the Germans, the English, 
the Italians, the Russians, / Turn them into hundred-per-cent 
Americans. / What else have they come to this country for? / 





















(Lawrence, 1972: 777). What threatens America and its futurity 
is it being overwhelmed and dominated by ‘hundred-per-cent 
Americans’, by those who ‘came’ attracted by the dream that 
now, if America is to redeem itself, has to be ‘undreamed’. The risk 
of America is precisely ‘America’ itself with its dreams of ‘ideal’ 
state and superpower status with their protocols remaining 
within the regime of knowing characterized by its endless, lim-
itless ambitions (the Snowden affair is a clear demonstration 
of the hubristic desires of the American state to know absolutely 
everything regardless of civil rights and political and economic 
costs). The ‘Indian’ that Lawrence eulogizes (although, to be fair, 
he warns us not ‘to sentimentalize about him’ [Lawrence, 1972: 
776]) represents the ‘savage’ (a word used by Lawrence himself) 
edge at which the human (with its unstoppable march of ‘prog-
ress’ and the system world built round the notion of equivalence) 
becomes intertwined with the nonhuman (or what the poet 
refers to as ‘the remnant of the old race’ [Lawrence, 1972: 
779]). In e. e. cummings’s poetic universe, the ‘savage’ obtains 
the name of ‘love’, the role of which is to undo the fabrications 
of the instrumental mind: ‘love’s function is to fabricate unknown-
ness’ (cummings, 1991: 446). The ‘unknownness’ in question 
is not a mere critique of the scientific mind, but a radical undoing 
of the whole Weltanschauung of the system world as represented 
by ‘America’ with its disfigured life, distorted epistemologies, 
and the dictate of the hoi polloi. In cummings’s words, ‘life’s lived 
wrongsideout, sameness chokes oneness / truth is confused 
with fact’ (cummings, 1991: 446). Both Lawrence and cummings 
warn us against the conflation of a certain type of apodictic 
sovereignity of the model state called ‘America’, a sovereignty 
jealously assigned to itself and projected as a general model 
to be imitated and exported.
This warning call derives from the inability to define what 
is, in fact, ‘America’. We have learned so far that ‘America’ 
can be seen more as a vision than as an accomplished project, 
that it has to protect itself from its own completion because 
only on this condition can it act on behalf of its futurity, which 
does not belong to the domain of simply what is to come 






















and technological advancement, America has to rediscover 
its ‘savageness’, or the ‘Indian’, which is a subversive force dis-
mantling and deconstructing the sphere of political and social 
stability preventing us from taking it at its face value. But also, 
we should note, that Lawrence and cummings offer a new 
interpretation of the human individual subject, a new version 
of the famous Emersonian principle of self-reliance. The British 
poet clearly expounds the centrality of the individual subject 
for futurity of America; he speaks about ‘a speck, a germ 
of American future in the heart of every intelligent American’ 
(Lawrence, 1972: 775). But this subject is already being eaten out 
by a germ that is nourishing him/her: the subject grows only 
on the condition that it ceases to be self-enclosed, that it is not 
a ‘hundred-per-cent American’, i.e., that it be open to the ‘savage’, 
or ‘love’, or thoughtful engagement in the undreaming of a dream. 
Thus, the community, as Roberto Esposito perceptively notices, 
‘isn’t joined to an addition but to a subtraction of subjectiv-
ity’, meaning that ‘its members are no longer identical with 
themselves but are constitutively exposed to a propensity that 
forces them to open their own individual boundaries in order 
to appear as what is “outside” themselves’ (Esposito, 2010: 138). 
As Esposito professes in the same passage, this also implies 
a refutation of the ‘sameness’ which, as cummings argued, 
is one of the principal features of the deformed life of ‘America’, 
as a certain type of dominating sovereignty: ‘If the subject 
of community is no longer the “same”, it will by necessity be 
an “other”; not another subject but a chain of alterations that 
cannot ever be fixed in a new identity’ (Esposito, 2010: 138).
What is  at  stake is  not an assent towards ‘America’ 
but a thoughtful dissent, not acquiescence (D.H. Lawrence’s 
term) but defiance, if not disobedience, towards ‘America’. A cer-
tain retraction, hesitation, and reservation must be positions 
taken towards ‘America’ not by its European or Asian partners 
but by America itself. This is a Derridean calculation concerning 
America energized by ‘reservations about its internal and foreign 
policies, about its jealously guarded sovereignty and its apparent 
disdain for international law and institutions, reservation about 





















but “the effective or practical name for the theological-political 
myth we call sovereignty”’ (Naas, 2008: 109). 
In the concepts developed by Jeffers in the long years 
of the Second World War, we could say that what America 
needs to do is to rediscover its tragic mission, or, perhaps more 
accurately, to conceive of its mission as a disclosure of the tragic 
which in the contemporary world has been replaced by the ‘pitiful’. 
In another of his suppressed poems, Robinson Jeffers maintains 
that the sense of the tragic consists in being able to recognize 
the ruination of our plans not only as an effect of the processes 
of human history (like a lost war, for instance) but as an interven-
tion of a force that collapses all human planning and translates 
human actions from the orderly to the chaotic and fortuitous. 
The tragic necessarily exposes man to Fate and therefore 
to the incumbent repulse of ambitions and unavoidable defeat. 
Hence, the politics of tragedy is an anti-politics: it aims and feeds 
off failure not success, and its war cry is not ‘glory to the victori-
ous’ but ‘glory to the vanquished’, Vae Victis or Weh den Geistigen. 
This is how Jeffers speaks about it in his 1943 poem ‘Tragedy Has 
Obligations’: ‘This is the essence of tragedy, / To have meant well 
and made woe, and watch Fate, / All stone, approach’ (Jeffers, 
1977: 158). The only success worthy of its name is then a par-
ticular manner of being linked with the world. ‘Obligations’ that 
form the heart of the tragic describe a special binding or, rather, 
bonding of man and the world, a connection in which man is not 
a superior power but recedes towards the background so that 
domination is replaced by togetherness that implies not only 
a belonging but also caring. We need to unseal the sense 
of the tragic so as to be bound together with the world again 
but also to feel obliged (in the meaning of solicitude and grate-
fulness) and obligated (that is bound to feel responsibility) to it.
The logic of obligation undermines everything that has been 
constructed and supported by the machinery of the state 
and the political. Obligation is an earthquake that destabilizes 
such systems, ends them, without however terminating them; 
i.e., it ‘ends’ in the sense of radical interrogation after which 
nothing is the same, whereas it is precisely the ‘same’ that 






















costs. But it also ‘ends’ in yet another important way: it brings 
the human with all the luggage of culture, which over centuries 
was giving in to the machinery and the mechanical, to the very 
edge where it has to face what defies and obliterates its schemes 
and structures. The world as we know it disappears not because 
we have been forgetful about it but just the opposite—because 
we have discovered our obligations to it. In one of his late texts, 
Derrida writes:
As soon as I am obliged, from the instant when I am obliged to you, owe 
it to myself to carry you, as soon as I speak to you and am responsible 
for you, or before you, there can no  longer, essentially, be any world. 
There is  no longer any  world to  support us, to  serve as  mediation, 
ground, earth, foundation, or alibi. Perhaps there is no longer anything 
but the abyssal altitude of the sky. I am alone in the world there where 
there is no longer any world. (Derrida, 2005: 158)
This kind of ‘ending’ certainly bespeaks the end of a certain 
predetermined identity, always founded upon the stability of tra-
dition, heritage, and law, that guards them against incursions 
of others, of ‘barbarians’, who are considered to be a deadly threat 
to the order of the world. The ending in question, the ending 
of a life that is predictable in its universalizing repetitive-
ness and summarizes its public aspect in such symbols meant 
to dogmatically unite all who believe in this particular line of life 
as, for instance, the flag, is the end of the continent. What hap-
pens in such a liminal space, littoral range of continent’s end, 
is a sudden estrangement of culture from itself, an opening 
in which a culture begins to seriously interrogate its own iden-
tity and priorities. This is a moment when members of a given 
culture begin to have doubts when it comes to describing them-
selves as a ‘we’ that is not only different from others but also 
marked with an indelible stigma of superiority. ‘We’, the ‘we’ 
that sounds so grand and powerful in the pronouncements 
and professions of the political world, the ‘we’ that sees itself 
embedded in the common history, now experiences a bereave-
ment: its history, established history dictating to the ‘we’ its line 
of life, is effaced, and its script so well-wrought in the memory 
of the nation becomes obliterated. The history as a process 





















rubbed it off, and become a cryptic code that cannot be gathered 
in any central myth. This is what happens in Jasper Johns’s famous 
1955 painting The White Flag, in which the contours of the Ameri-
can symbol are blurred, colors are removed, and exact stories 
of patriotic feats implied by the rich iconography associated 
with the flag have been replaced by the illegible excerpts from 
newspapers and magazines. In a stronger version of the same 
process, a culture undergoes what we may describe as the Gulliver 
effect: not only is a given culture diminished, but it is emptied 
of its glorious content, if not openly ridiculed. Robinson Jeffers 
makes such a Swiftian maneuver in one his suppressed poems: 
‘It is quite natural the two-footed beast / That inflicts terror, 
the cage, enslavement, torment and death on all other animals 
/ Should eat the dough that he mixes and drink the death-cup’ 
(Jeffers, 1977: 136).
To be itself, a culture must ‘lose’ itself, must see itself 
as an unfulfilled project, as a promise that has to remain open 
and vacant and therefore cannot defend itself because, in fact, 
there is nothing to defend. America thought of this way would 
then remain a messianic blueprint, the city upon a hill that John 
Winthrop sermonized about in the middle of the Atlantic in 1630. 
But the point of such projects is that, if they want to maintain 
their energy, they must remain a promise, a vision, a prophecy, 
a poetic design and effort. The ominous fate of America was that 
at one point it started to believe that the vision has come true, 
that the city has been built upon a hill for everyone to follow; 
then followers had to become qualified, approved of, in order 
to be admitted inside, and those rejected were considered 
barbarians besieging the town. In 1944, Robinson Jeffers pro-
phetically wrote about it in the following way: ‘We have enjoyed 
fine dreams; we have dreamed of unifying the world; we are 
unifying it—against us’ (Jeffers, 1977: 132). In the same poem, 
he outlines the evolution of America, which from the city upon 
a hill has become ‘Fortress America’ which ‘may yet for a long 























If America, or any other state for that matter, wants to redeem 
itself, it must disown, disinherit itself without rejecting its own 
heritage. As Jacques Derrida puts it:
What is proper to a culture is not to be identical to itself. Not to not 
have an identity, but not to be able to  identify itself, to be able 
to say ‘me’ or  ‘we’; to be able to take the form of a subject only 
in the non-identity to itself or, if you prefer, only in the difference 
with itself. There is no culture or cultural identity without this dif-
ference with itself. (Derrida, 1992: 9)
D.H. Lawrence sounds this warning in yet another way: 
Americans are, in fact, ‘Americans’ only to the degree to which 
they 1) realize that they are not original dwellers and thus have 
been already received in the land they claim theirs by somebody 
else who preceded them there, and 2) they are ‘Americans’ only 
when they refrain from being ‘one hundred-per-cent Americans’. 
The Americans will turn out worthy of this name only on con-
dition they recognize the fact that their line of life has been 
preceded by other lines and thus is founded upon something 
older and more savage than ‘America’. Here is D.H. Lawrence 
again: ‘It is your test, Americans. / Can you leave the remnants 
of the old race on their ground, / To live their own life, fulfil their 
own ends in their own way?’ (Lawrence, 1972: 779). 
The very choice of the word ‘test’ is meaningful with its inher-
ent skeptical questioning of America as fait accompli, an already 
fulfilled project outlined and accomplished by the ‘hundred-per-
cent Americans’. If we speak of a ‘test’, we move into the domain 
of conditionality, of a reality that is to come, a certain, or rather 
uncertain, futurity which opens in front of us. Nothing could 
be further from what Theodore Roosevelt professed in 1894 
as the doctrine of ‘true Americanism’, which eulogizes those ‘who 
have thought and worked, and conquered, and lived, and died, 
purely as Americans’ (Roosevelt, 1926: 207–15). One can easily 
point out that Roosevelt’s ‘America’ is a jealous and despotic 
monster founded upon the reenactment of the originary sacri-
fice: not only has one to become ‘purely American’ (‘We must 
Americanize them [newcomers] in every way’ [Roosevelt, 1926: 
201]), but one must apostatize from one’s own traditions (sup-





















to assume, more than just passively ‘assume’—to wholeheart-
edly, unreservedly, unskeptically, uncritically welcome what 
is ‘America’. Those coming over to America are not entering 
a domain of debate and interrogation, but just the opposite—they 
step upon the land that has already resolved the question of its 
identity and future. Roosevelt decisively and authoritatively 
claims that, unlike other countries such as those ‘stretching from 
the Rio Grande to Cape Horn’, America has resolved the prob-
lem of its national identity (Roosevelt, 1926: 209). As he says, 
‘politically this question of American nationality has been settled 
once and for all’ (Roosevelt, 1926: 209). Hence, it is only natural 
that the lot of newcomers, according to Roosevelt, depends 
upon whether or not ‘they throw themselves heartily into our 
national life, cease to be European, and become Americans like 
the rest of us’ (Roosevelt, 1926: 213). ‘America’ is then a place 
of the most general but, at the same time, most superficial 
metanoia; a territory where a tergiversation of one’s loyal-
ties takes place, where one relinquishes once and for all one’s 
previous line of life. But, as we have just said, this apostasy 
is both radical and guarded by serious sanctions (‘whoever does 
not so believe has no business to bear the name at all, and if he 
comes from Europe, the sooner he goes back there the better’ 
[Roosevelt, 1926: 213) and superficial; it is based on the total 
atrophy and blindness to the question of ‘what is’, for which 
Jan Patočka excavated a term from Plato: the care of the soul. 
You become an American by the exclusion and erasure 
of the traces of everything that is not ‘America’, and it is difficult 
not to notice that Roosevelt accentuates that this retraction 
and cultural apostasy ought to take place at the very moment 
you enter America. It’s the ‘shores’ which constitute natural 
cordonne sanitaire sorting out Americans from those who are 
not worthy of the name. The fortress America now obtains 
its variable; a harbor America, a port of call one where strict 
procedures hold. ‘Newcomers to our shores’ (Roosevelt’s phrase) 
are received hospitably only on condition of relinquishing who 
they have been so far: ‘We must Americanize them in every way, 
in speech, in political ideas and principles, and in their way of look-






















211). Only then can they truly enter the interior of the continent. 
America is an accomplished project, those who call themselves 
‘Americans’ must be such exclusively ‘one hundred-per-cent’, 
because, as Roosevelt maintains categorically, ‘We welcome 
the German or the Irishman who becomes an American. We have 
no use for the German or Irishman who remains such’ (Roosevelt, 
1926: 211). Thus, if you come to America, you have to do this; 
in fact, you CAN do it only already as an American, an individual 
who comes to American shores and is allowed inside America 
is an American part of a German, Irish, Polish subject. The shore, 
the edge of the continent, is not a place of welcome but of an 
ordeal, a sacrifice, an expropriation. America can be a gain 
but only on condition of a tremendous loss. The human is over-
come by being subjected to the rules that pertain to the domain 
of the ‘American’. The most characteristic feature of this realm 
is that within it a man/woman must sever his/her relationship 
with other sectors of the world, so that in fact the ‘world’ gets 
narrowed down and limited to one and only sphere called ‘America’. 
As Roosevelt pontificates, ‘We have no room for any people who 
do not act and vote simply as Americans’ (Roosevelt, 1926: 212). 
It is remarkable how the general line of life (‘act’) becomes one 
with a certain political choice; acting and voting are one because, 
having reached the American shore, you not only have relinquished 
your old line of life but also immediately endorsed the whole 
new system. If you refrain from doing this, you become ‘nothing 
at all’ (Roosevelt, 1926: 214). ‘America’ is then a positively defined, 
accomplished ‘something’ outside which you position yourself 
either as a hopelessly belated member of the ‘Old World’ or just 
plain ‘nothing’. As Roosevelt constantly reiterates, ‘Above all, 
the immigrant must learn to talk and think and be United States’ 
(Roosevelt, 1926: 215). Hence, he continues, Americans are those 
‘who have nevertheless thought and worked, and conquered, 
and lived, and died, purely as Americans’ (Roosevelt, 1926: 211).
Let us rehearse the sentence again: Americans are those 
‘who have nevertheless thought and worked, and conquered, 
and lived, and died, purely as Americans’. It announces that 
Americans will connect themselves with the world in a way dif-





















is linked with reality through the agency of the apparatus called 
the United States. He/she will work and think and dictate his/
her will to the other (‘conquer’) as the ‘American’; what is more, 
even life itself is not just that of a man but of the ‘American’. 
Thus, man’s life is never ‘naked’ because it is always, already 
at the threshold of America, at the shores of America, be they Ellis 
Island or Kennedy Airport, ‘dressed’ in the gear of the American 
line of life. The Biblical reference is never far away: at the shores 
of America, at the edges of the continent, man and woman, 
the newcomers to the New World, must lose their nakedness, 
and acquire a new shining dress, thinking with shame of their 
previous nudity. What happens at the shore of America is a reit-
eration, a reenactment of the transfiguration scene described 
by Mark in the ninth chapter of his Gospel. Christ is transfigured 
in front of the three apostles, three witnesses, three officials 
of the world, and ‘his raiment became shining, exceeding white 
as snow; so as no fuller on earth can white them’. Peter’s response 
to Christ ‘it is good to be here’ is precisely what Roosevelt wants 
to generate first from the officials receiving the newcomers 
(‘We freely extend the hand of welcome and of good-fellowship 
to every man’ [Roosevelt, 1926: 214]) and then from immigrants 
themselves (‘to bear then name of American is to bear the most 
honourable of titles’ [Roosevelt, 1926: 213]). 
Herbert George Wells produces an ironic version of such 
a transfiguration in his book of reflections on America, titled 
adequately The Future in America. Having commented upon 
the tension between the spirit of relentless ‘commercial com-
petition’ that effectuates ‘certain emptiness in the resulting 
wealthy’ and the ‘dim, large movement of thought towards 
a change of national method’, Wells insistently emphasizes 
the loss of the native garment, the original ‘nakedness’ of clothes 
which somewhat were extensions of the skin (Wells, 1907: 145). 
Upon arriving on American shores, the ‘incomer drops into 
American clothes, and then he does not catch the careless eye’ 
(Wells, 1907: 149). The immigrant, ‘very respectful, very polite’, 
has traded ‘some picturesque east-European garb’ for ‘cheap 
American clothes, resorted to what naturalists call ‘protective 






















The heavy-handed and ominous ambiguity of the very word 
‘collar’ testifies that Wells is referring not only to the sartorial 
realm but is also making a sociopolitical comment.
One could argue that America never paid much attention 
to Plato’s indictment that what constitutes human being 
is the care of the soul, the denial of which was a natural conse-
quence of the conviction that ‘American’ always dominates man. 
We have seen that ‘America’ offers life but only on the condition 
that you relinquish yourself. You enter ‘America’ not as yourself 
but already as an ‘American’. Thus you become a citizen having 
previously lost your personal past. Rodolphe Gasché maintains 
that man and the human soul are synonyms, and it is due to this 
synonymity that we can know ‘about the whole of the world 
and of life’ and consequently that ‘the soul, if cared for, is capable 
of beholding the world in its totality’ (Gasché, 2009: 234). If this 
is the case, then America’s accent upon ‘Americanism’, upon liv-
ing and dying ‘purely as Americans’, contests these suppositions. 
The care for the soul has been replaced by the care for the Ameri-
can, which is, as we already know, ‘the most honourable of titles’. 
If life is conditioned by and depends upon the care for the soul, 
then all reservations concerning this, all denials and depreca-
tions of this truth, must mean, if not a weakening of life itself, 
then at least its considerable distortion. Life is now defined 
not according to the logic of the care for the soul but according 
to the demands of the laws that determine, protect, and promote 
the American line of life. Roosevelt speaks about excommunicat-
ing anarchy and languages other than English (‘We believe that 
English, and no other language, is that in which all the school 
exercises should be conducted’ [Roosevelt, 1926: 212]) and pro-
hibitions (a ban on anarchy as ‘incompatible’ with American life 
[Roosevelt, 1926: 214]). Today America develops biometric means 
of control and has grown into a gigantic, impersonal machine that 
wants to know literally everything about everybody. The care 
of the soul has been supplanted by the care for the data.
Giorgio Agamben speaks about ‘the fleeting and almost inso-
lent pleasure of being recognized by a machine without the burden 
of emotional implications that are inseparable from recognition 





















equivalent of the joy that Roosevelt expresses over newcomers 
to the American shores who decide to relinquish their own cul-
ture, language, and person (Agamben, 2011: 53). D.H. Lawrence’s 
analysis of Americans emphasizes two crucial elements. First, 
it attacks and tries to undo the principle of the obligatory trans-
figuration on behalf of the peculiarity of the exceptional which 
has veered off the main line of life. Talking about the American 
Indian, Lawrence maintains that, ‘He is a savage with his own 
peculiar consciousness, his own peculiar customs and observations’ 
(Lawrence, 1972: 776). To save its futurity from a mere, neutral, 
and empty ‘future’, America needs to respect the ‘peculiar’, i.e., 
it has to demonstrate restraint in its mission as the city upon 
a hill. Second, and perhaps more importantly, Lawrence’s analysis 
urges America to wield its tremendous power with care and len-
ity. The futurity of America depends upon the degree to which it 
shows moderation in using its power, as the true manifestation 
of power consists in its mitigation. If America has a mission 
to accomplish, its gist is a powerful mitigation of power. Here 
is Lawrence again: ‘Because he is so absolutely in your power, 
that, / before God, you must be careful’ (Lawrence, 1972: 776). 
The mission of America is to hold back vis-à-vis the presence 
of the savage, and, let us say it openly, America has failed in this 
mission. As Michel Serres suggests, ‘The hominid must learn 
to hold back, must learn modesty and shame; and his language 
must learn understatement; his science, reserve’ (Serres, 1997: 117). 
This evolves into a kind of ethics of restraint and holding back, 
which is an ethics of new gentleness: 
The gentle man holds back. He  reserves some strength to  retain his 
strength, refuses in himself and around him the brute power that is propa-
gated. The sage thus disobeys the single law of expansion, does not always 
persevere in his being and thinks that elevating his own conduct to a uni-
versal law is the definition of evil as much as madness. (Serres, 1997: 119)
With this ethics of new gentleness that wants to care 
for the savage and that is founded upon the principle of holding 
back, of the un-powered power, we are returning to the logic 
of the conditional we have spoken about before. The ‘if’ structure 






















and sovereignty less in terms of power and more as a certain 
suspension of power. This is the opposite of what, according 
to Roosevelt, was taking place on the shores of America: what 
is to be relinquished now is not the particular which gives in 
to the force of the one general line of life, but just the oppo-
site—it is the apparatus that has construed and monitored this 
line of life that has to be suspended. Thus, if Roosevelt posits 
as one of the fundamental conditions of being an American 
a denial of ‘anarchy’, it is precisely a ‘beautiful anarchist’ whom 
is welcomed by e. e. cummings (cummings, 1991: 677). In his 1958 
collection, he envisages the hope of and for America in a way that 
anticipates by at least a quarter of a century Peter Sloterdijk’s 
practice of the cynical reason. Hence on the one hand we have 
Roosevelt’s true Americanism caricatured by cummings as ‘great 
pink / superme / diocr i/ ty of / a hyperhypocritical D / mocrac 
(sing / down with the fascist beast /boom / boom)’ (cummings, 
1991: 635); on the other, there stands, or rather incessantly 
changes, his position in a peculiar and scandalous movement 
of ‘swimfloatdrifting’, someone whose position and character 
is impossible to name unequivocally, a ‘trickstervillain / raucous 
rogue & / vivid Voltaire / you beautiful anarchist / (i salute thee’ 
(cummings, 1991: 677).
One should never let go unnoticed cummings’s spelling 
and typographical arrangements, which allow him to unobservedly 
shuttle from the level of the individual to the level of the public. 
Having launched his vitriolic attack on American democracy, 
as a kind of populist ‘democrac(sing down)’, he locates its sources 
in the egotistic turn that has dominated the life of the human 
individual. The mediocrity of the mass society is a ‘superME-
diocrity’; that is, the public is being shaped by the excessive 
desires and ambitions of the ego. The ‘subhuman superstate’ 
(of which we have read in another poem) takes its beginnings 
in the petrifications and ossifications of the superME. Sub-
human super-state serving the interests of super-me would 
be cummings’s formula for ‘America’ with its system construed 
of everything which ‘dull all regular righteous comfortable’, 





















Now the shores of America begin to mean something else. 
The general line of life called ‘true Americanism’ ceases to sup-
press the particular on behalf of one history and one list of virtues. 
This systematically arranged world called ‘America’ now is looked 
upon as if from the edge of yet another continent. America has 
reached another shore and now its major constitutive elements 
such as state, patriotism, law, freedom are placed in quotations 
marks. Hence cummings writes ‘quote citizens unquote’, ‘quote 
state unquote’, and the quotation marks perform a double func-
tion: they introduce a distance between ourselves and the notions 
they surround, the distance which is a space where the ‘thief crook 
cynic’ mind of the ‘trickstervillain’ works and where the concepts 
subjected to his operations are getting seriously scrutinized 
and critically worked upon, not merely accepted, as Roosevelt 
demanded in his creed of true Americanism. When Roosevelt 
requires, without reservations and provisos, a total apostasis 
from one’s previous identity and acceptance of the new one 
which is very precisely defined and measured, what happens 
at these other shores that America has reached, the shores of late- 
or post-modernity, is the dilution of such identity. For cummings 
the process of withdrawal of the rigorously determined code 
of identification implies two movements. First is the recogni-
tion and bringing to the center of attention life itself, existence 
which does not privilege the human, neither does it respect 
human measures of time or rational explanations of what life 
is. In fine, what must emerge is life before it was provided with 
qualifications produced by the human discourse. Thus, we have 
to become aware of history not as a mere sequence of events 
shaping the horizon of human existence, but we have to experi-
ence ‘the gay / great happening illimitably earth’ (cummings, 1991: 
663). The second movement takes its energy from this illimit-
ably happening earth where the ‘illimitably’ marks reservations 
concerning the possibilities of finding expressions for this kind 
of ‘happening’ in the human discourse and thinking. cummings’s 
neologism ‘illimitably’ suggests that we must both try to under-
take the effort of naming phenomena of the happening earth 
and recognize a failure of such an undertaking. As cummings 






















and isn’t and won’t be words’ (cummings, 1991: 631). This leads 
to, as we have already seen, a necessary confusion of grammar 
and its categories and, ultimately, to the undermining of the very 
foundations of the human subjecthood. It is important to note 
this mutual entanglement of the human subject and language: 
cummings’s radicalism in disfiguring and distorting the English 
grammar certainly is the manner in which his American subject 
voices his or her uneasiness vis-à-vis the illimitably happening 
earth. If we remember Roosevelt’s insistence upon English 
(supposedly grammatically correct English) as the only linguistic 
means that ought to be present in American society and edu-
cation, we will plainly see the difference between the events 
happening on the American shores. Roosevelt’s empowered 
state becomes the state in quotation marks, and the subject-
hood upon whose strictly American contours Roosevelt is so 
insistent now melts, thus also raising doubts as to the character 
of American democracy. Let us look at an interesting sequence 
from e. e. cummings’s Xaipe collection: ‘are flowers neither why 
nor how / when is now and which is Who / and i am you are i am 
we / (pretty twinkle merry bells) / Someone has been born / 
everyone is noone’ (cummings, 1991: 630). The human subject 
loses its strongly separate human identity: born as ‘someone’, 
he/she enters the life of ‘flowers’, the effect strengthened 
by the first line of the poem, which reads ‘blossoming are 
people’ (cummings, 1991: 630). At the same time, we obtain here 
a critique of the democratic order of hoi polloi, as the ‘everyone’ 
of the constructed political order becomes ‘no one’, and the social 
organization empties itself out to be no more than a network 
of anonymous, disposable numerical units.
‘America’ approaches then a condition which Bataille maps 
out for the future society, a condition certainly utopian, the force 
of which consists in dislocating the society from the anthro-
pocentric and anthropomorphic pattern that has ultimately 
dominated its structures. Norman O. Brown in the early 1990s 
turned towards Bataille to revive the spirit of American politics 
as ‘that utopian promise to replace the ‘government of men’ 
with the ‘government of things’ (Brown, 1991: 192). This has 





















or the ideology of returning to Nature (‘It cannot be the obsolete 
Nature worship that conservationism is vainly trying to resus-
citate’ (Brown, 1991: 197); it has all to do with a construction 
of the society which is profoundly related to life, of which 
it is an expression. The society as life embodied whose aim can 
be achieved only when the human subject holds back his rights 
as the unique and exceptional entity, precisely becoming ‘a’ sub-
ject rather than ‘the’ subject. Such a move would be tantamount 
to erasing the quotation marks surrounding and conventional-
izing such notions, as cummings has demonstrated, as ‘state’. 
What is at stake is whether or not we can ‘grasp the full reality 
of an embodied life of polymorphous bodily communications, 
to contradict the spectral world of entertainment, and narcis-
sistic dreams of pleasure without pain’ (Brown, 1991: 193). We can 
look at Lawrence’s test for America and cummings’s postulates 
of undoing life, which is, in fact, mere ‘undying’ as an attempt 
at construing one body, a Spinozistic life in which ‘there is no 
privileging of the human form or the human species as microcosm’ 
(Brown, 1991: 135). In such polymorphous life there is nothing that 
could be ‘one hundred-per-cent’. Hence, when Lawrence sets his 
test for Americans in which he wants them, the most civilized 
and technologically advanced people, to understand the ‘savage’ 
and then to admit that they are only guests in a  country which 
is not their ‘own’ at all, he in fact asks them whether or not 
they are able to accept life rather than ‘undying’. This in turn 
undermines major principles of the socioeconomic-political 
order. Such embodied life, as Brown says, ‘is not hierarchically 
organized by functional subordination of past to a principal part, 
the representative part, the “head” of the body. Consequently, 
his [Spinoza’s] political theory of collective participation in one 
body has nothing to do with medieval (or Hobbesian) notions 
of unification through sovereign representative; or with corpus 
Christi, in which Christ is the head of the Church’ (Brown, 1991: 133). 
From this perspective, America presents its shores as the place 
where Hobbes gives way to Spinoza. What used to pave the way 
for us to become members of a gigantic machinery of the state 
and its agencies now withdraws before the power of human 






















productions of official ideologies, where the national colors 
fade till we all gather under the white flag. America welcomes 
not by binding newcomers to the unconditional loyalty to the flag 
(‘He must revere only our flag; not only must it come first, but no 
other flag should even come second’ [Roosevelt, 1926: 215]) 
but by opening our eyes so that we see all national loyalties 
take their beginning in the life embodied, in the life of (as Velvet 
Underground used to sing) ‘white light, white heat’. Jasper Johns’s 
white flag does not try to communicate anything else. This 
is how Norman O. Brown summarizes this Spinozistic transfor-
mation taking place on the edge of the continent: ‘it can be seen 
as setting the historical agenda for us today: to rectify the flaw 
in modernity; to arrive at one world; to reorganize the gigantic 
material process of intercommunication released by modernity 
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